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Social capital is often extolled as a benevolent resource, but resources can be applied 
to any number of ends. Using new data from the India Human Development Survey 
(N=41,544), I examine social capital and patriarchy and demonstrate that social 
capital works to enhance restrictions placed on women’s autonomy, revealing a 
darker side. Households which are well tied into their communities avail themselves 
to greater scrutiny and thus anticipate and react to the prescriptions of dominant, 
patriarchal norms. This study employs multivariate logistic and ordinal logistic 
regression to model the relationship between four measures of women’s autonomy 
and the social capital of households: 1) wearing a veil; 2) eating order during meals; 
3) mobility; 4) and decision making. A male-first eating order and restrictions on 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Much has been written recently on the empowering potential of social capital. 
As an enhanced ability to readily draw upon the resources of neighborhood and 
community, social capital is overwhelmingly portrayed as an unambiguous boon. 
Implicit in these arguments is that those who have been unable to draw upon their 
community, or are otherwise shut out, are deprived of a needful resource. Perhaps so, 
but social resources can be applied to any number of ends, and that which appears 
beneficial to a community can in fact hold detrimental if not unintended 
consequences for particular residents. Looking at individual households, one can not 
simply assume that emergent sources of social capital will affect all members, both 
men and women, of the household evenly. Rather, social capital is just as likely to 
empower as it is to constrain. 
A burgeoning literature is nevertheless paying greater attention to the double-
edged nature of social capital. For instance, it notes with irony that the social capital 
which characterized the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s and 1930s was fairly robust (see 
Putnam 2000). Berman (1997) demonstrates that a rich associational life eventually 
served to undermine the Weimer Republic of the same era (Berman 1997), and 
paternalist forms of social capital have been shown to effectively preclude 
unionization in a mill town in the southern United States (Schulman & Anderson 
1999). What is apparent from each of these cases is social capital’s so-called “dark-
side”. 
I similarly draw attention to the other side of the social capital coin and 




networks built between households are related to patriarchal practices found 
throughout Indian society. Specifically I argue that the household’s access to social 
capital—its engagement with its community—is coterminous with constraints placed 
on women’s behavior and mobility. 
There are two broad explanations for a relationship between social capital and 
constraints on women’s behavior. First, households which closely follow prevailing 
norms may be predisposed to engage with their community. Households, for example, 
recognize and anticipate a community’s power to sanction, which means that those 
who are already in compliance with dominant norms may be emboldened to forge 
greater access to social capital within their communities. 
Second, the community can be regarded as engaging and having an influence 
on the workings of a household. Here the ties which bind a household to its 
community are also arrangements which accord the community enhanced access to 
household affairs. One’s neighbors, therefore, may play a supporting role to the 
household in enforcing norms and even monitoring compliance, and in a patriarchal 
context, influence on women may be facilitated by such networks. Thus the 
household’s role as a norm enforcement institution may be primary but is informed 
by the household’s social location within the broader community. Mere proximity to 
the benefits of social capital, then, sets the stage for greater enforcement of 
patriarchal norms.  
Households anticipate and react to their communities, and those who are 
endowed with access to social capital may anticipate and react in ways which are 




given to the dark side of  social capital; that within such integrated households in 
India, women may comply more readily with dominant norms of appropriateness, 




Chapter 2 : Social Capital and Its Dark Side 
 
James Coleman’s attention to the way in which communities or households 
create and apply social constraints is instructive for this analysis. From Coleman 
(1988) we find, for example, that Jewish diamond merchants in New York readily 
hand each other bags of stones to examine at their leisure, and the defection of any 
single merchant by an act of theft would be punished through a severance of ties. 
Here, Coleman sought to develop the concept of social capital, and submit it for use 
as a conceptual tool to aid in explicating the mechanics of social structure. The 
merchants’ shared trust is clearly social, but takes shape as a type of capital, because 
like material capital it facilitates the attainment of certain goals—in this case, 
inexpensive collaboration among merchants (Coleman 1990). 
Often forgotten is Coleman’s elaboration that norms too can be similarly 
conceived as forms of social capital, because like trust, they also inhere in the 
relations between two or more individuals and facilitate goal attainment. Thus young 
children in Jerusalem, Coleman observed, were often allowed to stray beyond the 
constant supervision of their parents because of neighborhood social capital or 
normative prescriptions shared by the community that ensured local children would 
be looked after. 
  Norms represent an important attribute of social control, which facilitate the 
pursuits of some agents above others and create patterns of behavior, which are 
“appropriable by others as a resource” (Portes 1998, p. 7). Figures of authority create 
and maintain norms with their own interests in mind, and as Coleman (1993) points 




interest of certain others. Furthermore, there is necessarily a degree of collusion 
involved in enforcing norms, as the costs incurred from doing so, must be shared 
evenly. 
In writing of the norms typically associated with small communities, Coleman 
(1993) points to their often constraining and coercive character and uneven 
application:  
They are inegalitarian, giving those with most power in the community 
freedoms that are denied others. They discriminate, particularly against the 
young, enforcing norms that are in the interests of elders; they inhibit 
innovation and creativity; they bring a grayness to life that dampens hope 
and aspiration...[and] the interests of different members of the community are 
weighted differently (p. 10). 
 
Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) is often credited with expanding on the work of 
Coleman. While similarly recognizing that norms constitute a type of social capital, 
Putnam made the case that not only does social capital inhere between individuals but 
communities can be holders of it. Thus by measuring how readily households join 
community organizations, Putnam argued that one can discern how much social 
capital is “stocked” by a particular community, and by extension, how much civic-
minded behavior one could expect a community to exhibit.  
Like Coleman, Putnam acknowledged that certain norms may serve dubious 
ends. “Social inequalities may be embedded in social capital,” and adds that “A 
recognition of the importance of social capital in sustaining community life does not 
exempt us from the need to worry about how that ‘community’ is defined” (Putnam 
2000, p. 358).  Still the thrust of Putnam’s work, his focus on building strong 
democracies and the benefits of civic engagement, suggests that good social capital 




Indeed, a good amount of development literature extols the benefits of social 
capital, and is seemingly preoccupied with directing policymakers on how to better 
cultivate, harness, tap (Khan 2006), link or bridge (Woolcock 1998) it. The tendency 
to promote strategies aimed at exploiting social capital reveals an implicit assumption 
that the benefits apportioned by social capital outweigh any impairments, or that the 
ends to which social capital is directed are, on balance, beneficial to communities and 
households.  
In rural Tanzania, for example, households with greater stocks of social 
capital, as measured by degree of associational membership, were shown to have 
higher incomes. They are said to enjoy better public services, employ more effective 
agricultural practices, and they demonstrate a propensity to use credit when 
purchasing agricultural improvements (Narayan & Pritchett 1999). Reporting on data 
from northern India, Krishna (2001) asserts that in concert with capably trained 
leadership, villages with greater stocks of social capital are better able to reap the 
flow of public benefits.  
In a similar vein, group-based micro-credit programs like the Grameen Bank 
are heralded as organizations that have successfully built or tapped social capital 
(Khan 2006, Pitt et al. 2003). Proponents of micro-credit emphasize social capital, not 
as a norm, but as network tie. They claim that it empowers women by creating and 
strengthening their economic networks, enhancing their ability to borrow, and 
ultimately increasing their incomes. In making a contribution to the household 
income, women are thought to be better able to negotiate change within their 




reportedly increased women’s mobility, or “the odds that a husband will report that 
his wife travels alone outside the house, the odds that a woman reports traveling 
outside the house at all and that she reports traveling outside alone” (Pitt et al. 2003). 
Critiques of such work are most incisive insofar as they note that some benefit 
more from social capital than others, and some are excluded from benefits altogether. 
Thus there is a tendency to focus on the benefits related to enhanced social capital 
while ignoring the more primary issue of access, leading Beall (1997, p. 960, 2001) to 
criticize the concept as luring analysts to “ignore structural issues and obscure the 
issue of collective power.”  Cleaver (2005) makes this point emphatic in her study of 
Tanzania when she concludes that the vulnerability of people most in need of social 
capital simultaneously excludes them from reaping its benefits. 
Mayoux (2001) reports that women in Cameroon, for example, are often 
unable to profit from belonging to credit groups because physical segregation of the 
sexes means that women are unable to work freely in male-dominated, market spaces 
without making themselves vulnerable to sexual harassment or other forms of abuse. 
Thus, social capital does not on its own afford people the ability to meaningfully 
transcend structures of inequality organized along such lines as caste and gender; nor 
in the case of women living under patriarchal norms does social capital easily provide 
them with the means to renegotiate the power dynamics circumscribed by systems of 
kinship, family and household. Indeed, Mayoux (2001) asserts that “a particularly 
serious shortcoming in current discussions of social capital from a gender perspective 
is the uncritical treatment of relations within households,” and while “households and 




norms which regulate relations within them” (p. 450, 453). Goetz and Gupta (1996) 
echo this concern when they note of women in Bangladesh that the micro-credit 
dispersment—a material “achievement” of their social capital—was often controlled 
by husbands or other men. Thus there is good reason to be suspicious that the benefits 
of social capital flow equally to all groups, or that women in particular are necessarily 
empowered through greater community engagement. 
In his useful review, Alejandro Portes (1998) goes beyond an analysis of 
whether the benefits of social capital are distributed equally, and instead summarizes 
work that suggests social capital is sometimes explicitly detrimental to individual 
interests. In total, he identifies four negative consequences of social capital. First, 
Portes notes that groups bounded in solidarity may exclude just as readily as they 
include, so for example male networks may be able to hoard and effectively deny 
women access to resources. In the second case, the closure and solidarity of a group 
may be the source of its undoing, as a successful individual from the group will be 
overwhelmed by the petitions of less successful members. Third, where 
“downtrodden” groups are formed based on a shared experience of adversity, 
individual success stories may prove to threaten the very basis of group cohesion. The 
result is the promotion of downward leveling norms, which prevent any single 
member from doing markedly better than the group. Finally, and most relevant to this 
paper, Portes recalls Coleman in suggesting that keeping an eye on neighborhood 
children and the surveillance which facilitates social control and norm enforcement 




restrictive of personal freedoms, which is the reason why the young and the more 
independent-minded have always left” (p. 16). 
 In the community of Coleman’s example, where there exist norms of 
informal surveillance, members of the community have a direct means of influencing 
the behavior of individuals. The instance of a household, then, becoming integrated 
within such a community might only enhance the community’s leverage over the 
lives of individual household members. Similarly, I look at India in this paper and 
argue that a household’s social proximity to its community enhances the community’s 
access to household affairs. Households which are inclined to interact closely with 
their communities avail themselves to greater scrutiny. They anticipate and react to 
the dominant norms of their community and comply with those norms as a means of 
avoiding sanction and sustaining their access to social capital. Insofar as dominant 
norms prescribe restrictions on women’s autonomy, it stands to reason that social 





Chapter 3 : Patriarchal Norms in India 
 
There is a substantial literature devoted to explicating patriarchy in India, 
much of which draws attention to its emblematic outcomes, such as sex ratios that 
reveal a son preference and greater access to healthcare and education among males. 
As is pertinent to my argument, a portion of this work has been concerned with 
detailing practices and patterns of behavior that reinforce gender discrimination and 
constrain women’s autonomy. Kinship systems constitute one unit of analysis that has 
received a fair amount of attention (Dyson & Moore 1983, Karve [1953] 1993, 
Trautmann [1981] 1993), but the Indian household and corporate family have also 
been identified as primary sites where patriarchy is created, sustained and reinforced 
(Beteille [1991] 1993). 
Moreover, patriarchy is a multidimensional concept that demands a great deal 
of specification. For example, it encompasses both public and private settings. Public 
perceptions are considered, for example, when restrictions are placed on female 
mobility or women are compelled to wear a veil. On the other hand, patriarchy has 
been examined as something which pervades the private sphere, as when women are 
unable to make decisions for their household or must habitually eat last during meals.  
Thus, as with eating order, patriarchy can be conceived of as entailing habitual 
or unexamined behaviors. For instance, the practice of wearing a veil, or what is 
referred to as practicing purdah, ghungat, or pallu among married women, constitutes 
another important means of restricting women’s autonomy. While practicing purdah 
does not in itself seclude women, except in a symbolic sense, it denotes a complex of 




Furthermore, practicing purdah denotes a context-sensitive interaction ritual that 
effectively prevents women from establishing direct access to resources (Sharma 
1978).  
The very architecture of a home and choreography of household members 
when visited by guests suggest purdah and reveal the underlying importance of 
seclusion and exclusion of women. That is, daughters and wives are given designated 
spaces or rooms, distinct from those of men, and on the occasion that the household 
receives a male visitor, women may be obliged to remain strictly segregated 
throughout the visit. 
A second approach to examine patriarchy, in line with restrictions placed on 
household decision making, takes as its subject more direct affronts on women’s 
autonomy. Adolescent and married women, for instance, are often obliged to stay in 
or near the household, and are restricted from entering public spaces unescorted by 
male kin. Their seclusion can be understood as a normative convention, but the 
household can be seen as an enforcement institution as well. In its capacity to surveil 
and redress behavior, as well as its direct role in granting or denying permission to 
travel unescorted to local destinations, the household secludes through direct 
restrictions on women’s mobility. 
Underlying public and private contexts are variations in women’s autonomy 
stemming from status constructions. Among upper castes, physical seclusion may be 
packaged more favorably as a departure of women from arduous physical labor 
outside the home. Thus women of high caste (and class) may experience greater 




Just as restrictions placed on women’s autonomy and the enforcement of 
patriarchal norms vary by status group, such practices have also been observed to 
vary throughout the life course of women (Sharma 1978). In a patrilocal context, it is 
the abiding relationship a new bride forms with her husband inside the household that 
may be perceived as a threat against the patrimony. Bonding and intimacy between a 
new couple can be a subject of much concern, as it suggests the ability of a bride to 
drive a wedge between her husband and the patrimony. With time, however, 
especially after a woman has children, restrictions both inside and outside the 
household are typically lifted (Sharma 1978). 
Geographic variations in women’s autonomy are no less important, and the 
degree of women’s autonomy and the normative constraints placed on women have 
also been observed to vary considerably from north to south (Dyson & Moore 1983, 
Karve [1953] 1993). Dyson and Moore (1983) convincingly argued that one salient 
line of demarcation can be sketched approximately along “the contours of the Satpura 
hill range, extending eastward to join the Chota Nagpur hills of southern Bihar.” 
Wearing a veil or practicing purdah stands as a clear example of this regional 
variation. However, while restrictions on women’s autonomy are generally noted to 
be most pronounced in the north as compared to the south, blatant deviations from 




Chapter 4 : Sustaining Patriarchy 
 
How is patriarchy produced and reproduced? Marriage and kinship practices 
have received a good amount of attention. In the north, in those states of Gujarat, 
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana, much has been 
made of the practice of exogamy and the way in which the power of women is 
undermined from the very start of a new marriage. There is the account of a new 
bride leaving her natal village, taking on daunting responsibilities in her new 
husband’s home and often being subjected to the scrutiny of a watchful mother-in-
law. Analysts point out that the moment a woman joins her husband’s household, her 
natal ties begin to erode and a dependency is forged between her and her affinal kin 
(Kandiyoti 1988, Karve [1953] 1993). Thus women of families that practice exogamy 
are said to be disadvantaged and disempowered because they are deprived of personal 
leverage among their husband’s natal kin. 
If one turns to the south, to those states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra, exogamy is practiced in fewer villages and the 
separation of a new bride from her natal family is less absolute. Gender 
discrimination and restrictions on women are correspondingly regarded to be less 
pronounced. In the southwest, in particular, matrilineal communities can even be 
found; however, as Patricia Uberoi (1993) notes, while “it is generally conceded that 
women have greater importance and autonomy in such societies, authority still resides 
primarily with men” (p. 114). 
While focusing on marriage and kinship provides a compelling account of the 




to adequately account for the continued incentives a household has to enforce 
normative constraints on women. On this score, a literature which examines the 
protecting and controlling of women’s sexuality in north and south India does a better 
job (Bennett 1983, Derne 1994, 1995, Liddle & Joshi 1986, Sharma 1980). At stake is 
the honor of the patrimony (izzat), and women’s promiscuity outside the household, 
alleged or real, has been constructed as one very tangible means of threatening that 
honor (Derne 1994, Yalman 1963). Girls, therefore, find themselves spending more 
time inside their homes just as they enter adolescence, and once married, restrictions 
of behavior and autonomy continue (Standing 1991). In remarking on the 
determinants of fertility, for example, Dyson and Moore (1983) note that "from the 
male standpoint, the continual involvement of women in pregnancy and childcare 
activities can be seen as a way of reducing the risk of sexual violation of wives" (p. 
48). 
One tangible consequence of dishonor is boycott. That is, as Steve Derne 
(1995) has pointed out, a family that harbors a woman who is perceived to be 
promiscuous may find they have difficulty arranging marriages for their sons and 
daughters or brothers and sisters (see also Billig 1991, Kolenda 1978, 1993). Thus the 
mobility and behavior of women are not restricted simply because men and women 
internalize patriarchal norms as some have suggested (though norms most certainly 
are internalized) (see Derne 1995, Dyson & Moore 1983); rather, the very real 
consequences associated with failing to constrain women’s autonomy justifies and 





I contend that households which have greater access to social capital or are 
better integrated within their communities tend to more rigidly adhere to patriarchal 
norms. Specifically, the relationship households maintain with their communities is 
central, and I posit that women who belong to households which are better tied into 
their communities will incur greater constraints on their general autonomy. 
Households where women are inclined to partake of restrictive norms may be 
more likely to join community organizations. Insofar as associational membership is 
regulated, households may be granted membership based on their conformity with 
dominant norms. Here there is a very straightforward recognition that people who are 
deemed to behave “inappropriately” or in ways that challenge dominant modes often 
confront barriers to integration within the broader community. 
An alternative explanation focuses more on the role of households as playing 
a key role in enforcing community norms. Households, in anticipation of the social 
benefits of greater community integration, may be inclined to more closely monitor 
the degree in which household women visibly conform to received norms. On the end 
of associational membership, I argue that households, once they have forged multiple 
alliances with the residents of their community more readily avail themselves to the 
monitoring and influence of that community. Thus the event of a household forging 
new and deeper links within vicinal networks exposes that household to greater 
scrutiny and lays bare its chosen level of compliance with dominant norms.  
Insofar as the community can be conceived of as controlling access to the 
benefits of social capital, it is able to wield influence over the affairs of a particular 




looms as a constant threat. In a patriarchal context, the independent behavior of 
women and that which may be construed as noncompliant are ready subjects for 
gossip. Charges of female promiscuity, for example, may uncouple hard-won 
alliances between families, and unleash a collective boycott on the household, but 
gossip is not aimless chatter, for well-tied households are likely to be early recipients 
of such talk and might be expected to react quickly to curb the offending behaviors. 
Failure to act has real consequences, and on this score, the patrimony has much to 
lose; a woman who oversteps her bounds may not only jeopardize existing ties, but 
also the household’s ability to form alliances in the future. 
 Thus households themselves can be seen as primary sites of norm 
enforcement, and those with greater proximity to community stocks of social capital 
(e.g., households that are engaged in community groups) are more inclined to prohibit 
and clamp down on behaviors that may threaten the honor of the patrimony. The 
behavior of women is closely scrutinized, and restrictive norms are more rigidly 
applied because the household perceives itself to be more visible to the community 








The nature of the relationship between community integration and conformity 
begs consideration. To what degree are conforming households more likely to engage 
with their communities, and to what extent do communities levy influence over the 
affairs of member households? My analysis will not attempt to definitively sort out 
causality, but instead, I focus on establishing whether there is empirically a positive 
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Chapter 5 : Public and Private Behaviors 
 
Not all behaviors are allotted equal concern, and one can scarcely anticipate 
the constraints applied to specific measures of women’s autonomy without first 
placing the behavior of interest in an appropriate context. Recent work by Desai and 
Vanneman (2007) suggests one salient distinction to be made is that between private 
and public behaviors (see Table 2). In so far as norm conformity may be a 
performance or display, one might expect that women’s autonomy is especially 
curtailed in a public context. 
Therefore, the event of a woman traveling unaccompanied to the local health 
center, to the home of a friend or relative, or a local store is a potential liability for 
which the household might be called to account. It follows that well-integrated 
households—those who perceive themselves to be more closely scrutinized—would 
be inclined to rigidly enforce public norms concerning women’s mobility. 
 
H1a: among households which are better integrated with their 
communities, women experience greater restrictions on their mobility 
outside the home. 
 
Similarly, women of integrated households should be more inclined to abide 
by habitual, but equally visible, norms such as purdah practice. 
 
H1b: among households which are better integrated with their communities, 





On the other hand, characteristically private matters, such as who decides 
what to cook, whether an expensive item is purchased, what to do if a child falls sick, 
and to whom one’s children should marry—all of these decisions can be made with a 
measure of relative discretion and without jeopardizing the honor of the patrimony. 
  
H2a: among households which are better integrated with their 
communities, women are not more likely to experience restrictions on 
their decision making. 
 
Similarly, women of integrated households should not be more inclined to 
abide by habitual norms if such norms unfold most typically in a private setting. 
 
H2b: among households which are better integrated with their 
communities, women are not more inclined to practice a male-first 




Chapter 6 : Data and Methods 
 
The above hypotheses are related in that they posit a relationship between a 
household’s access to social capital through integration within the community and 
restrictions on women’s autonomy. To test these hypotheses, I use new data from the 
India Human Development Survey (IHDS), collected from 2004 through late 2005. 
The data set is compromised of over 40,000 households and spans 33 states and 
Union Territories. Both urban and rural households were selected to compose a 
nationally representative sample. 
 
Independent Variables 
I employ a regression analysis in order to test the relationship between social 
capital and restrictions placed on women. My analysis is rather straightforward in that 
it follows the work of others in operationalizing social capital as associational 
membership (Grootaert & Narayan 2004, Haddad & Maluccio 2003, Narayan & 
Pritchett 1999). Households are deemed to have greater or lesser access to social 
capital based on the number of groups or associations in which they claim 
membership. The questionnaire asked respondents if “anybody” in the household 
belonged to a particular group; thus, any single individual’s membership counted for 
the entire household, and in this way I will measure social capital at the household 
level. 
Other researchers examining social capital have preferred using measurements 
of trust and participation in informal networks. Krishna (2001, 2004), for example, 




particularly inappropriate in the context of Rajasthan, India. There, he observed that 
the creation of formal organizations is rarely a voluntary initiative. Indeed, local 
officials are often judged on the basis of how many groups they can set up each year, 
and he adds that “People sign up to get the benefits; the target is achieved; then 
everyone goes home” (Krishna 2001, p. 931). While this observation is well taken, it 
is reasonable to expect that even short-lived, involuntary participation among 
households may yield important consequences for individual households and the 
members of those households. 
My analysis is aided in that data collected in the IHDS is not restricted to a 
single state, and the organizations vary in their degree of formality. Respondents were 
asked to consider themselves and others in the household when answering nine yes-
no questions, each for a different organization. “Does anybody in the household 
belong to”: 1) “youth club, sports group, or reading room”; 2) “trade union, business 
or professional group”; 3) “self help group”; 4) “credit or savings group”; 5) 
“religious or social group or festival society”; 6) “caste association”; 7) “development 
group or NGO”; or 8) “agricultural, milk, or other co-operative.” I use these nine 
dichotomous variables to construct an additive index of the associational membership 
of households. A preliminary look at Cronbach’s alpha suggests that the index has a 
reasonable estimate of reliability (0.60). Figure 2 illustrates the incredible amount of 
variation in associational membership. Wholly 63.9% of households did not belong to 


































14.4 % of households reported belonging to caste associations, and at 14.2%, 
nearly the same number of households reported membership in religious associations. 
Contrast this with 1.6% of households who reported belonging to associations with a 


































Mean membership varies considerably by state as well. As Table 1 
demonstrates, households in Kerala reported belonging to nearly two associations on 
average, while households in Punjab/Chandigarh were members of fewer than one 








Table 1. Associational Membership by State 
 
North India mean membership 
Punjab/Chandigarh 0.0884 
Haryana 0.2285 
Uttar Pradesh/Uttaranchal 0.1220 
Rajasthan 0.3240 
Madhya Pradesh/Chhatishgarh 0.4444 
Gujarat, Daman, Dadra 0.5796 
Jammu & Kashmir 0.2629 
Himachal Pradesh 0.5057 
Delhi 0.2325 
Bihar/Jharkhand 0.8391 
West Bengal 0.2053 
Assam 1.6931 
North East 1.6993 
Orissa 0.5779 
Maharashtra 0.9422 
Andhra Pradesh 0.8844 
Karnataka/Goa 1.1678 
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry 0.7807 
Kerala 1.9180 




The dependent variables used in my analysis are taken from questions in the 
“Gender Relations” component of the questionnaire and were posed to one eligible 
woman in each household. I specifically address four indicators of women’s 
autonomy: 1) whether the eligible woman practices purdah; 2) her physical mobility; 
3) whether the eligible woman makes common household decisions; and 4) whether 
men in the household take their meals before women. 
As Table 2 indicates, the dependent variables I have chosen are intended to 
represent both the public and private contexts. In choosing these variables, I suggest 
that variation in the restrictions placed on women will pivot on whether the particular 




example, while household decision-making and eating order are largely beyond the 
community’s gaze and therefore may be considered private, walking unescorted to the 
health center or spurning the veil are relatively conspicuous and readily available for 
public consumption. 
 
Table 2. Dimensions of Female Autonomy 
Private Public 
decision making mobility 
eating order purdah 
 
I first look at purdah practice. Women were asked, “Do you practice 
ghungat/purdah/pallu?” As this variable is dichotomous (yes or no), I employ a 
logistic regression to test the predicted probability that a woman will practice purdah 
for any given level of household associational membership. By calculating an odds 
ratio, I estimate that when a given independent variable increases one unit, the odds 
that a woman practicing purdah will increase or decrease by a given factor, when 
other variables are controlled. 
 As discussed earlier, purdah exists as the most visible of a complex of 
behaviors, which teach married women when it is particularly important to be passive 
and whom to regard with deference. As a convention that is contextually specific and 
contingent on the status of the person with whom a veiling woman finds herself 
confronted, purdah seems designed to limit a woman’s ability to communicate with 
powerful individuals, and therefore, it limits too a woman’s access to resources.  




probability of women practicing purdah, the results are intended to suggest one 
aspect of the relative ability of women to access social resources more generally. 
 The habitual, often unexamined character of purdah stands in contrast to more 
straightforward exclusions women face, such as those which result from restrictions 
placed on physical mobility. Restricting a woman’s movement beyond the enclosures 
of the home constitutes one very direct way in which a patrimony may cultivate 
dependency, as it reduces a woman’s ability to gain leverage in affairs beyond (and 
within) the household. Like purdah, constraints placed on mobility have a uniquely 
public character in that they derive from the household’s concern with its honor vis-à-
vis the community.   
For each of three common destinations—local health center, the home of 
relatives or friends, and the kirana shop—interviewers asked women, “Can you go 
alone?” (yes or no). If a respondent indicated she did not need to acquire permission 
to travel outside the home, interviewers often failed to ask her whether she could “go 
alone” to a particular destination. Because it is impossible to know whether women 
who did not need permission to go out were allowed to travel alone, I have opted to 
drop these records from the analysis. In total, there were approximately 2,000 such 
cases. 
66.2% of respondents could travel unescorted to the local health center, while 
68.7% of respondents could go to a friend’s home alone. The highest percentage of 





Using these three variables, I construct a mobility scale ranging from 0 to 3, 
where women who are able to go alone to all three locations are considered the most 
mobile with a score of 3. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean St Dev 
purdah 0.5482 0.4977 
women’s mobility 2.1781 1.1574 
women’s decision making 1.4587 1.2498 
male-first eating order 0.6596 0.4738 
male education 6.5208 5.0974 
female education 4.1910 4.8472 
# of married females 1.2191 0.7023 
# of married males 1.1689 0.6864 
household assets 11.2741 6.0636 
women’s age 32.8130 8.0537 
 
In order to model the effects of associational membership on women’s 
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The ability of women to make decisions for the household constitutes another 
dimension of women’s autonomy. However, unlike purdah practice and mobility, 
household decision making is not often the object of public spectacle. Whether a 
woman customarily makes household decisions or is bypassed entirely is a dynamic 
largely concealed from public view.  
The IHDS asked women, “Please tell me who in your family decides the 
following things?: 1) What to cook on a daily basis; 2) Whether to buy an expensive 
item such as a TV or fridge; 3) How many children to have; 4) What to do if a child 
falls sick; 5) To whom your children should marry?” The eligible female respondent 
was able to consider the questions and offer a yes or no response for each of five 




other). The respondent could also answer “not applicable” or that “no one” decided. 
If more than one person was indicated to make the decision, then the respondent was 
asked, “Who has the most say?” 
For each type of household decision, I create a dichotomous variable, set to 1 
if the respondent makes the decision and 0 if any other person makes the decision. If 
more than one person makes the decision, I code the variable using the respondent’s 
answer of who had the most say. Women clearly had the most say regarding what to 
cook on a daily basis (74.3%); however, only 10% had the most say in regards to 
whom their child should marry (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Percent of Women with “Most Say” by Decision 
Decision Items % with Most Say 
what to cook on a daily basis 74.3 
whether to buy an expensive item 11.1 
how many children to have 20.1 
what to do if a child falls sick 30.7 
to whom a child should marry 10.0 
 
Taking the resulting five dichotomous variables, I create a scale of women’s 
decision making ranging from 0 to 5. 19.5% of women respondents reported that they 
did not have the most say in any of the aforementioned decisions, while only about 
5% had the most say in all five of the decisions asked. Most women surveyed, 
however, only had the most say in one decision (43.9%).  
Much like women’s mobility, I model the effects of associational membership 
on women’s decision making using ordinal logistic regression. Here, household 
decision making constitutes private behavior, and as such, I have hypothesized that it 
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The order in which men and women take their meals within a household 
constitutes a second private measure of women’s autonomy. Eligible women were 
asked, “When your family takes the main meal, do women usually eat with the men? 
Do women eat first by themselves? Or do men eat first?” Four response options were 
given: 1) eat together; 2) women first; 3) men first; and 4) varies, other. I dichotomize 
this variable such that 1 captures households where women eat first or men and 
women eat together. Households in which men eat first or the order varies will be 
coded 0. 
As is appropriate for a dichotomous dependent variable, I model the 
relationship between associational membership and eating order using logistic 
regression. The eating order a household takes can be conceived of as a habitual 




lines between men and women, and in this way it resembles the practice of purdah. 
Unlike purdah, however, the eating order of a household is essentially private, and 
therefore, should not co-vary with associational membership. 
 
Control Variables 
I include controls for caste, tribe and religion. If, for instance, higher caste 
households demonstrate a propensity to forgo joining associations, this relationship 
might conflate an understanding of the relationship between associational 
membership and women’s autonomy (see Figure 6). In addition, restrictions on 
women’s autonomy may vary by caste. Based on the answers provided from the 
“household head,” each household has been classified as belonging to one of six 
categories: high castes (21%), other backward castes (36%), dalits or scheduled castes 
(22%), adivasis or scheduled tribes (8%), Muslims (11%), and other religions (e.g., 
Christians, Sikhs, and Jains) (3%). I create a dummy variable for each category, 
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The level of education within a household may also affect the associational 
membership, as when households with relatively high education may be more 
inclined to subscribe to sentiments of egalitarianism and thus less likely to enforce 
restrictions on women’s mobility or purdah. Thus, in order to effectively capture the 
response of my dependent variable to changes in associational membership, I control 
for education. For regression analysis, I operationalize educational attainment as the 
highest years of education of any adult male and of any adult female in the household. 
The result is two distinct gender-specific, continuous measures of education. The 
range in each variable spans from 0 years to 15 years or more. Figure 7 makes use of 
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I control for two characteristics of household structure. First, households with 
extended families may be, ceteris paribus, more likely to have high levels of 
associational membership by virtue of having a larger number of household members. 
Also, norms which restrict women’s autonomy may be more readily enforced in these 
households due to the presence of more senior family members, such as the husband’s 
mother or father or a mother-in-law. To control for joint family structure, I include a 
variable which represents a count of the number of ever married women in the 
household. 
Associational membership may be greater among households which can 
afford to participate; therefore, I have included a control for household wealth (see 




dichotomous variables, each indicating the presence or absence of a distinct 
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The level of empowerment a woman experiences should not be regarded as a 
fixed endowment, but instead as periodically changing during the life course. 
Restrictions on mobility outside the home or the imperative of wearing a veil may 
differ considerably for new brides as compared to mothers; therefore, I attempt to 
control for this variation by adding a female age variable into the models. 
                                                 
1
 The full list of items includes: cycle/bicycle, sewing machine, generator set, mixer/grinder, 
car/motorcycle/scooter, black & white television, color television, air cooler, clock/watch, electric fan, 
chair or table, cot, telephone, cell phone, fridge/refrigerator, pressure cooker, car, AC, washing 
machine, computer, credit card. at least two pairs of clothes, shoes/chappals, LPG use, pucca wall, 




Finally, following the work of other researchers who have analyzed Indian 
society (see Vanneman et al. 2006), I control for regional diversity by adding state 
dummies. As Table 1 demonstrates, state variation in associational membership is 
considerable in India. Similarly, I control for regional effects along urban and rural 
lines. Rural households claimed membership in 0.72 associations on average, whereas 




Chapter 7 : Results 
 
 I have argued that households with greater access to social capital can be 
expected to conform more closely to prevailing norms, as these households anticipate 
and react to enforcement pressures which emanate from the lager community. 
Conforming households may also be predisposed to engage with their communities, 
thus gaining more access to extant social capital than their non-conforming 
counterparts. 
While my theoretical discussion has broadly focused on cornerstone norms, 
which uphold prevailing systems of stratification, empirically, I examine just four 
restrictions on women’s autonomy—mobility, purdah, decision making, and eating 
order. 
Mobility. One publicly visible restriction often levied against women in India 
is on movement outside the home, and hypothesis H1a anticipates that among 
households which are better integrated with their communities, women experience 




















Table 5: Mobility, Purdah, Decision Making and Eating Order Regressed on Household Assoc. 
Membership 
          
  Model 1     Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
  Mobility     Purdah   Decision Making   Eating Order   
  Coeff. S.E.   Coeff. S.E.   Coeff. S.E.   Coeff. S.E.   
household assets 0.005 0.01   -0.018 0.01 ** 0.002 0.00   0.039 0.01 *** 
male education -0.017 0.01 *** 0.027 0.01 *** -0.023 0.00 *** -0.003 0.01   
female education 0.037 0.01 *** -0.052 0.01 *** 0.027 0.00 *** 0.030 0.01 *** 
Other Backward Caste 0.128 0.05 * 0.203 0.06 *** -0.131 0.04 ** 0.012 0.05   
Scheduled Caste 0.136 0.06 * 0.172 0.06 ** 0.034 0.05   0.232 0.06 *** 
Scheduled Tribe 0.256 0.08 ** -0.845 0.09 *** 0.040 0.07   0.538 0.09 *** 
Muslim -0.322 0.07 *** 2.214 0.09 *** -0.083 0.05   0.312 0.08 *** 
Sikh, Christian, Jain 0.212 0.11   -0.681 0.13 *** -0.122 0.09   0.352 0.14 ** 
(Upper Caste omitted)                 
urban residence 0.254 0.04 *** -0.552 0.07 *** 0.106 0.04 ** 0.383 0.05 *** 
Number of married 
females -0.108 0.07   0.312 0.07 *** -0.419 0.08 *** -0.325 0.07 *** 
Number of married 
males -0.312 0.07 *** -0.067 0.07   -0.513 0.08 *** -0.409 0.07 *** 
Age of eligible woman 0.041 0.00 *** -0.012 0.00 *** 0.030 0.00 *** 0.007 0.00 ** 
Himachal Pradesh 0.377 0.14 ** -0.143 0.21   0.197 0.15   1.400 0.19 *** 
Punjab / Chandigarh -0.260 0.14   -0.395 0.21   -0.220 0.16   -0.463 0.17 ** 
Haryana -0.132 0.14   1.506 0.21 *** -0.676 0.15 *** 1.118 0.19 *** 
Delhi 0.000 0.14   0.082 0.22   -0.379 0.15 ** -0.143 0.17   
UP / Uttaranchal -0.717 0.13 *** 1.233 0.20 *** -1.032 0.14 *** -1.874 0.14 *** 
Bihar / Jharkhand -1.313 0.13 *** 0.967 0.21 *** -0.146 0.15   -2.321 0.15 *** 
Rajasthan -1.043 0.12 *** 2.684 0.21 *** -0.848 0.15 *** -0.910 0.15 *** 
MP / Chhatishgarh -0.959 0.12 *** 1.468 0.20 *** -0.843 0.14 *** -1.131 0.14 *** 
West Bengal 0.084 0.13   0.682 0.20 *** -0.230 0.14   -0.343 0.15 * 
Orissa -0.390 0.14 ** 0.545 0.21 ** -0.272 0.15   -1.661 0.16 *** 
Assam -0.365 0.18 * 0.379 0.23   -0.365 0.17 * -0.532 0.22 * 
North East 0.861 0.19 *** -0.657 0.22 ** 1.579 0.18 *** 1.642 0.27 *** 
Gujarat, Daman, Dadra 0.233 0.15   1.406 0.21 *** -0.563 0.16 *** 1.984 0.20 *** 
Maharashtra 0.599 0.14 *** -0.404 0.20 * -0.127 0.14   0.049 0.15   
Andhra Pradesh 0.037 0.13   -2.415 0.21 *** -0.622 0.14 *** -0.337 0.15 * 
Karnataka / Goa 0.023 0.13   -2.257 0.21 *** -0.457 0.14 *** 1.312 0.18 *** 
Tamil Nadu / 
Pondicherry 0.007 0.15   -2.275 0.37 *** 1.250 0.17 *** 0.734 0.18 *** 
Kerala 0.671 0.16 *** -2.065 0.21 *** -0.597 0.15 *** 0.901 0.19 *** 
(Jammu & Kashmir 
omitted)                       
membership index -0.056 0.02 ** 0.023 0.02   -0.013 0.02   -0.124 0.02 *** 
             
Constant    0.338      1.370   
             
Observations 27,730   33,278   30,801   33,281   
 
 The results which model the association between women’s mobility and social 




controls, the associational index coefficient is statistically significant and supports my 
argument that women who belong to households with greater social capital are more 
likely to experience restrictions on their autonomy. With each additional association a 
household belongs to, one can expect a 0.06 decrease in the log odds of women’s 
mobility. 
 Turning to the controls, the educational attainment of men appears to undercut 
women’s mobility. For every additional year of education held by the male head of 
household, one can expect a 0.02 decrease in the log odds of women’s mobility. In 
stark contrast, higher educated women are more likely to travel to local destinations, 
and the magnitude of the coefficient of women’s educational attainment appears to 
trump that of male education. Here, for every additional year of education held by the 
female head of household, one can expect a 0.04 increase in the log odds of women’s 
mobility. In regards to caste and religion, Muslims—in comparison to upper caste—
are less likely to travel unaccompanied to local destinations. Women appear to enjoy 
greater mobility if they belong to a scheduled tribe, scheduled caste, or other 
backward caste. Finally, older women are more mobile than their younger 
counterparts. 
  Purdah practice. As I have argued, the practice of veiling also denotes 
restrictions placed on women’s autonomy in a very publicly accessible form. 
Hypothesis H1b anticipates that women from households which are more integrated 
with their communities—those with greater access to social capital—are more likely 




 In Model 2, purdah is regressed on associational membership using 
multivariate logistic regression. While the coefficient is in the expected direction, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant, and I can not conclude that women who 
belong to households with greater social capital are more inclined to practice purdah. 
The household assets index coefficient is statistically significant, however, 
and demonstrates that with an increase in a single household asset, one can expect a 
0.02 decrease in the log odds of practicing purdah. Expressed in terms of an odds 
ratio, with each additional asset, the odds of women practicing purdah can be 
expected to decrease by a factor of 0.98.  
Turning to education, women are more likely to practice purdah in households 
with highly educated men. For each one-year increase in the education among male 
heads-of-household, one can expect the odds of a woman practicing purdah to 
increase by a factor of 1.03. As with mobility, women’s education appears to have a 
countering effect on purdah practice. With each one-year increase in the education of 
the eligible female, the odds of practicing purdah decrease by a factor of 0.95.  
As one might expect, Muslims are more likely to practice purdah in 
comparison to upper caste individuals. While the magnitude of the coefficient is less, 
this also appears to be true for people who reported to belong to an other backward 
caste or scheduled caste. In line with expectations, those who reported belonging to a 
scheduled tribe or reported themselves as Christian, Sikh, or Jain, are less likely to 
practice purdah.  
Women who reported living in urban areas were less likely to veil than those 




autonomy may lesson as women transition from being daughters to mothers. Older 
women were less likely to veil than younger women. With each added year in age, 
one can expect the odds of practicing purdah to decrease by a factor of 0.99. 
Finally, women who belonged to households where more than one married 
woman resided were more inclined to veil than women who did not live with other 
married women. Households with two or more married women are likely to represent 
joint families, and this statistically significant coefficient suggests that, net of 
controls, women of such households experience greater restrictions on their 
autonomy. 
 Decision Making. As a more private dimension of patriarchy, I have suggested 
in hypothesis H2a that the degree to which women are able to make household 
decisions should not co-vary with household access to social capital. The results of 
Model 3 demonstrate the relationship between social capital and women’s decision 
making, using ordinal logistic regression. Women who belong to well-integrated 
households do not appear to be more or less likely to have the most say in household 
decisions. This supports my argument that greater access to social capital does not 
necessarily bear on more private restrictions placed on women’s autonomy. 
 The coefficients for men and women’s education are again statistically 
significant. Women who belong to households with highly educated men appear to be 
less likely to have the most in household decisions. Women’s education may work in 
an opposite manner. With each additional year of education reported by the eligible 




Finally, older women appear to enjoy more decision making power than their 
younger counterparts, as do women who live in urban areas. In contrast, women who 
live in joint family households appear to be less likely to have the most say in 
household decisions. 
 Eating Order. In Model 4 I test the association between household access to 
social capital and the outcome variable eating order. In line with women’s decision 
making, I have suggested in hypothesis H2b that among households which are better 
integrated with their communities and have greater access to social capital, women 
are not more inclined to practice a male-first eating order during meals. The 
coefficient demonstrates that households with greater access to social capital are in 
fact more likely to practice a male-first eating order during meal times. With each 
additional association to which a household belongs, one can cautiously expect a 0.12 
decrease in the log odds of men and women eating together, women eating first or the 
order varying. In terms of the odds ratio, net of control variables, each association to 
which a household claims membership can be expected to decrease the odds of eating 
together by a factor of 0.88.  
 Thus there is evidence to suggest that eating order is associated with social 
capital in a way contrary to the expectations outlined in hypothesis H2b. One reason 
for this unexpected finding is that eating order, much like purdah, may be 
representative of a complex of behaviors and can not be straightforwardly assumed to 
be a private dimension of patriarchy. 
Turning to the control variables used in Model 4, the household assets index is 




asset, one can expect a 0.04 increase in the log odds of men and women eating at the 
same time, women eating first, or the order varying. The odds-ratio suggests that with 
each additional asset, one can expect the odds of eating together to increase by a 
factor of 1.04. 
Once again, the signs are different on the coefficients for men and women’s 
education; however only the coefficient for women’s education is statistically 
significant. Men are not as likely to eat first as a matter of daily practice in 
households where women are highly educated.  
Muslims and people who claimed to belong to a Scheduled Caste were less likely 
than Upper Caste persons to practice a male-first eating order. Those who belong to a 
scheduled tribe are less likely to practice a male-first eating order by a factor of 1.70. 
People who live in urban areas are less likely than their rural counterparts to 
practice a male-first eating order during meals, and the practice of an eating order 
appears to vary by family structure as well. Women in joint families are more likely 




Chapter 9 : Discussion 
 
As with any resource, it stands to reason that social capital can be used to 
disempower just as easily as it empowers. The benefits reaped by well integrated 
families exist just beyond the reach of certain other families. Those who are poised on 
the banks of their community, witness the flow of benefits which may come to exist 
as an enticement, a way to better one’s lot. But just before or just after forging their 
own access into these vicinal resources, a household likely assesses itself, and if 
necessary, makes change. My argument has focused primarily on how the second 
order consequences of “tapping” social capital, are such that dominant norms are 
reaffirmed. In a patriarchal context, it follows that norms which restrict women’s 
autonomy may be most pronounced in those households with the greatest access to 
social capital. 
While the cross-sectional nature of the IHDS data does not allow me to draw 
conclusions regarding sequence and timing, I have theorized that a household’s 
compliance with dominant norms, and particularly those regarding women’s 
autonomy, may stem from the household’s anticipation of benefits to be received, its 
reaction to the threat of benefits withheld, and the experience of benefits revoked by 
the larger community. 
Moreover, if a household’s interaction with its community is paramount, I 
have hypothesized that public restrictions on women’s autonomy will likely be more 
salient than those which occur largely in the home and which are beyond the purview 
of public scrutiny. Thus the likelihood of a woman wearing a veil or traveling to local 




The more private matter of her eating order and whether she has a say in household 
decisions should not. 
In support of my hypotheses, this analysis has demonstrated that women who 
belong to well integrated households tend to be less mobile. In contrast to 
expectations, however, I did not find evidence to support the hypothesis that women 
of such households also tend to veil. This came as a surprise because of the four 
dimensions of women’s autonomy, practicing purdah is arguably the most obvious 
demonstration of compliance with local norms. 
Turning to private dimensions of women’s autonomy, as expected there 
appears to be no statistically significant relationship between women’s household 
decision making and community integration; however, the same is not true for eating 
order. Women of well-integrated households appear to be more likely to eat last when 
taking a meal. 
The results suggest moderate support for one particular dark side of social 
capital. However, I could not conclude that there exists a meaningful distinction 
between public and private restrictions on women’s autonomy. 
 
The correlation between eating order and social capital was unexpected and 
best highlights the apparent irrelevance of drawing a careful distinction between 
public and private spheres. Furthermore, the propensity for women to practice an 
eating order in a private setting poses a prima facie challenge to the depiction of the 
household as an instrumental entity, which largely responds to pressures emanating 




dominant norms so as not to jeopardize access to the community’s resources, then the 
question is begged: if nobody is watching, why display? I offer two explanations for 
the findings of this study, and each further retains two core aspects of my argument. 
First, households remain as key entities that maintain and recreate patriarchy, and 
second, in a patriarchal context, community integration may negatively impact on 
women’s autonomy. 
The observed relationship between eating order and social capital suggests 
that households might be conceived of as more arrantly coercive entities, which 
compel women to conform to dominant norms, even when women do not perceive 
such conformity in their own immediate interests. Instead women recognize that 
eating last during meals is of little benefit to their household’s standing within its 
community, yet the eating order in well-integrated households is nonetheless 
observed. 
This may be due to a tacit acknowledgment, on the part of household 
members, that the work of norm enforcement is easier to uphold in public settings if it 
is also reinforced in private. While restrictions placed on certain private dimensions 
of autonomy, such as household decision making, may be inefficient in illustrating for 
men and women their respective “places”, restricting more symbolic dimensions of 
autonomy, such as an eating order, makes the point in a manner difficult to miss. 
 Women, by this logic, can be perceived as engaging in self-regulation 
(primarily when in the public sphere) but they are also coerced (primarily in the 




regulation and a household’s coercion work in tandem, the once important distinction 
made between public and private forms of autonomy appears to fall away. 
A second way to reconcile the correlation between eating order and social 
capital supplements a conception of households as primarily instrumental entities, 
which are oriented to the task of maximizing resources, with a recognition that 
households sometimes reflexively adopt and promote the dominant norms of their 
communities, even without an identifiable resource to be gained. If as West and 
Zimmerman (1987) famously suggested that conceptions of gender are an emergent 
feature of interaction among actors, the household is an entity which may direct the 
kind of conceptions of gender which emerge. Drawing from the idea of “doing” 
gender, it may be that households provide the setting which helps to ensure that 
gender is consistently done in a particular way. 
The household manipulates its surrounding environment in such a way as to 
reify understandings of gender as a natural and hierarchical division. For instance, 
some households adjust physical spaces in order to designate rooms within the home 
to be for the exclusive use of men (see Mehta 1990), but go further by reinforcing 
physical demarcations with both informal and formalized rules and practices. By 
propagating symbolic acts, such as a strict eating order during meal time or the 
practice of veiling or purdah, households are key entities for maintaining patterns of 
deference and demeanor between men and women; however by this theory the 
motivation for doing this is not principally instrumental. 
Here, private restrictions are not placed on women exclusively to reap 




communities, are more inclined to regard prevailing norms as givens and adopt them 
as official household “rules” without question. Through more frequent interactions 
with more people, members of well-integrated households may be more thoroughly 
indoctrinated members of their community, and to the extent dominant norms are 
called into question, well-integrated households may be better versed in justification 
and argumentation which upholds the utility of such norms. 
By this logic, the restrictions women experience on their autonomy should not 
necessarily vary along public and private dimensions. Households are conceived to be 
less instrumental and not compelled to place restrictions on autonomy as a pragmatic 
consideration. Indeed, if “doing” gender was something that could be routinely 
activated and deactivated depending on whether others were watching, it would likely 
hold less sway as a process that posits natural divisions between men and women. 
While I have provided two very plausible explanations for why women in well 
integrated households practice a male-first eating order and face restrictions on their 
mobility, by rejecting the public/ private distinction, the problem is restated and can 
be taken up in the next analysis. 
Finally, if not public and private, what typology can sketched for dimensions 
of women’s autonomy in order to allow us to better understand the mechanisms of 
patriarchy? One such typology might shed light on why I did not find that women 
were less inclined to have decision making power, yet more inclined to practice 
purdah in households with access to social capital? More broadly, future analyses 
would do well to investigate further the ends to which social capital is applied, 




development. Only when viewed in its entirety can an adequate understanding of 
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